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National Intelligence Daily

Tuesday 15 April 1980

Top Secret CO NID 80-089.IX

Top Secret

15 April 1980

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Approved For Release 2007/09/19 : CIA-RDP82T00466R000200020070-3

ation Report Iran			. 7
Iran			5 7
Iran			5 7
USSR: Fuel Shortages			5 7
USSR: Fuel Shortages			, 5 , 7
Liberia: Continuing Uncertainty			, 5 , 7
Liberia: Continuing Uncertainty			, 5 , 7
Cuba: Demonstrations Planned			. 7
Cuba: Demonstrations Planned			. 7
Rhodesia: Status of Security Forces France: Nuclear Power Program USSR-Bulgaria: Assault Helicopters			. 8
France: Nuclear Power Program			
USSR-Bulgaria: Assault Helicopters	, , , ,	0 0 0	9
·			, ,
·			
Italy-China: Berlinguer's Visit	• • • •		. 10
			. 11
Mexico: Oil Exports			. 12
Morocco: New Arab Aid			
al Analysis			
Israel: Begin's Outlook and Political Positi	ition .		13
_		•	

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
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SITUATION REPORT		
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IRAN		1
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hostages until after the US presidential	Khomeini wants to keep the l elections.	25X1 25X1
	omeini believes that	25X1
the continued incarceration of th		
President Carter's defeat.		25X1 25X1
		207(1
Khomeini has increasingly fo	ocused his attention in	
recent months on President Carter ments. He may have concluded tha		
Egypt rules out any chance for hi	s extradition and now	
wants to punish the US for past s	support of the Shah.	25X1
Relations with Iraq		
		25X1
unlikely unless the internal situ	en Iran and Iraq is wation in either country	25X1
deteriorates markedly. The Iraqi	leadership is primarily	
concerned with remaining in power major problems, activities, and o		
open armed conflict. Iraq and Ir likely to increase their efforts	an, however, are both	
lems for the other.	to provoke internal prob	25X1
Iran has again accused Irag	of attacking several	
Iranian gendarmerie border posts, the fourth consecutive day. Chan		
tinue as both countries remain on		
aircraft.		25X1
	Top Secret	25X1
1	15 April 1980	25X1
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USSR: Fuel Shortages	
Compre final about 2000 v	your monorted in the Hkraine
primarily because of the lat	were reported in the Ukraine, te winter cold. Coal produc- in, Ukraine's largest producer, em also contributed to the
150,000 barrels per day belo and growth is continuing to Eastern Bloc customers are b	lag this year. Sales to
	Top Secret
	15 April 1980

Approved For Release 2007/09/19: CIA-RDP82T00466R000200020070-3



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LIBERIA: Continuing Uncertainty	
The security situation in Monrovia remain new government is making some progress in resta	ns tense, but the oring order.
The government has received only a response to yesterday's pleas for residuork and for businesses to reopen. The is advising American citizens to remain but there are no reports of increased heigners. The most pressing problem fact the restoration of order and halting in rests by the soldiers—will require the a better functioning military command s	dents to return to E US Embassy still I in their homes, I arassment of for- Eing the government I discriminate ar- E establishment of
In his first nationwide broadcast leader Doe emphasized that the coup was ruption in government and unequal econo opportunities. Although Doe did not me of former government officials by a mil he said there would be no "witch hunts. parently were delayed in response to di and the delay may help quell the growin on the Americo-Liberian elite.	s prompted by cor- omic and social ention the trial itary tribunal, " The trials ap- plomatic pressure,
Doe's cabinet includes military me overs from the former government, and fleaders, including Togba-Nah Tipoteh, loriented group. Doe is relying heavily Matthewshis new Foreign Minister and left-leaning Progressive People's Party under arrest for treason but was releasers.	ormer opposition eader of a Marxist- on Gabriel leader of the rwho had been
Matthews possibly believes that he emerge as the dominant figure in the ne that the military leatheir limitations, will be willing to r	w regime, and adders, aware of
civilian government.	

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15 April 1980

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Rumors of invasions and countercoups have begun.
Early this morning Doe alerted
that armed forces from the Ivory Coast had crossed into
Liberia. This has been vigorously denied by the Ivorian
Minister of Defense. Other rumors had a battalion of
Liberian troops moving toward Monrovia.

The government, meanwhile, is facing critical shortages of food, fuel, and cash. Matthews has made a formal request for US Government assistance in helping overcome the expected shortfall of rice--a staple food.

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15 April 1980

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CUBA: Demonstrations Planned	
The Cuban Governmentangered by growing is cism over the Peruvian Embassy situationhas bedemonstrations in support of the regime.	nternational criti- gun to stage large
	000 03 E-
The demonstrations began last weeker Cubans massed in Havana pledging loyalty government. An editorial in the party dayesterday stated that I million Cubans at the Peruvian Embassy on Saturday. A sim to march to the US Interest Section on I island-wide demonstrations to protest pleasercises at the US Naval Base at Guanta	to the Castro aily newspaper re to parade past ilar number are May as part of anned military
The shrill and defensive tone of the	e editorial sug-
gests that Castro wrote it. In the past	
massive demonstrations to generate public	
ficult times and to divert attention from	m the regime's
economic problems.	m che regime s
economic problems.	
By announcing the march on the Perudays in advance, Castro also may be hopinget of violence will frighten the refugithe compound. Castro, moreover, probably occasion—the 19th anniversary of the Batto deliver a major address attacking Washe interprets as US threats aimed at Cub.	ng that the pros- ees into leaving y will use the y of Pigs victory hington for what

15 April 1980

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RHODESIA: Status of Security Forces	
The Rhodesian military is concentrating on training activities and preparing for amalgamation with the guerrillas into a new national army.	\$
responsibility for reestablishing law and order and tracking down renegade guerrillas has been turned over completely to the police. Police patrols are accompanied by guerrilla officers and are under orders not to use force if at all possible to avoid straining relations with the guerrillas.	n
The last of the Army reservists mobilized for the election in February are being released from active dut and armored vehicles loaned by the South Africans have been returned. Normal recruit training is continuing, but some units do not expect to receive any more white draftees and are preparing for the inflow of guerrilla personnel after independence.	у,
The pessimism in the military that followed Robert Mugabe's election victory is slowly giving way to a more optimistic mood as a result of Mugabe's moderate stance. Nevertheless, many of Rhodesia's most experienced personnel have chosen to resign and leave the country with a guarantee that pensions will be remitted in hard currency.	
The military and guerrilla representatives on the amalgamation committee are still discussing integra procedures for the new army, as well as its size and or ganization.	tion

15 April 1980

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FRANCE: Nuclear Power Program
France is the most active among the major developed countries in reducing its dependence on imported energy through an ambitious nuclear power program.
By 1985 France should have 50 reactors that are expected to supply over half of the country's electricity. So far, the program has met little public opposition, apparently because most of the populace sees no alternative means of reducing France's dependence on foreign oil. In an effort to head off localized opposition, the government recently reduced electrical rates in areas close to the nuclear sites, following a rise in rates nationally.
Paris also is taking steps to secure uranium supplies and to develop domestic enrichment and reprocessing facilities. France will produce only 20 percent of its uranium needs domestically by 1985, down from 50 percent at present.
The bulk of France's foreign uranium supplies now comes from Niger and Gabon, where the French have partial ownership in several mines. French-owned companies also are moving more actively into direct equity participation in the production and exploration of uranium deposits in Africa, Canada, Australia, and the US.

15 April 1980

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USSR-BULGARIA:	Assault Helicopters	
		Soviet MI-24

Hind helicopter gunships at an airfield in south-central Bulgaria. This delivery is somewhat unusual because no other non-Soviet Warsaw Pact country has nearly so many Hinds, and Bulgaria normally lags behind other Warsaw Pact members in receiving new Soviet combat equipment. The Hind has a combat radius of 250 kilometers and can carry bombs, rockets, antitank guided missiles, and machineguns. It is intended to provide fire support for ground forces, and is being used extensively by

Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

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15 April 1980

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ITALY-CHINA: Berlinguer's Visit

Italian Communist chief Berlinguer arrived in Beijing yesterday on the first leg of a 10-day trip to China and North Korea. Before departing, Berlinguer reportedly said that the visit to China would confirm the full restoration of relations between the Italian Communists and their Chinese counterparts. In a clear bow to Moscow, Berlinguer added that the visit was not directed against the interests of any other Communist party.

Nevertheless, the trip follows the Italian Communists' condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and their refusal to attend a Soviet-backed conference of European Communist parties to discuss defense issues. Berlinguer's opening to China almost certainly is intended to improve Italian Communist chances in important local elections this June and ultimately to boost their aspirations for a direct governing role.

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15 April 1980

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MEXICO: Oil Exports

Mexico is doubling its average annual oil exports this year to about 1 million barrels per day, but the government has announced that exports will be held to about 1.1 million barrels per day through 1982. Principal beneficiaries of increased exports this year are the US, Japan, Canada, France, and Spain. We expect Mexico to raise oil production after 1982 only enough to cover domestic demand and finance imports needed to achieve economic growth targets.

Assuming real oil prices increase by 5 to 10 percent a year, Mexico will need to increase exports to about 2 million barrels per day by 1985 to sustain an economic growth rate of 8 percent per year, which we consider likely for Mexico through 1985. If Mexico were to use large oil sales to push growth much above 8 percent, import requirements would soar, transportation and storage bottlenecks would become critical, and inflation would rise rapidly.

MOROCCO: New Arab Aid

Five hundred million dollars in Arab assistance will help fund Morocco's efforts
to combat the Algerian-backed Polisario guerrillas in
Western Sahara.

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15 April 1980

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

ISRAEL: Begin's Outlook and Political Position

Prime Minister Begin views his Washington visit as the preliminary round to an eventual US-Israeli-Egyptian summit on Palestinian autonomy. He will concentrate on probing and influencing US policy and appealing for Congressional and American public support. Begin also will seek new insights into President Sadat's ultimate requirements to help determine what Israeli tactical concessions could facilitate an autonomy agreement and avoid undermining the peace treaty. Begin has given no hint, however, that he is prepared to consider major substantive changes in his negotiating position.

Begin regards the turmoil in Iran and Afghanistan as proof that Muslim political instability and Soviet adventurism--and not the Arab-Israeli conflict--are the central threats to peace in the Middle East. He considers Western pressure to resolve the Palestinian question misguided and a menace to Israel's security.

To rally domestic and international support, Begin has played extensively on fears of greater Soviet influence with Syria, Iraq, and the Palestine Liberation Organization. He repeatedly has justified his hard line on autonomy as designed to prevent a Palestinian state, which he predicts would be a Soviet-controlled "mini-Afghanistan."

The Prime Minister has cited the recent Palestinian terrorist attack on an Israeli kibbutz to "prove" that Palestinian aims have not changed and to buttress his contention that Palestinian prerogatives in the West Bank and Gaza must be limited to minor administrative duties.

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15 April 1980

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
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Domestic Debate

Begin's dogged personal advocacy of Jewish resettlement in and near heavily Arab-populated areas of the West Bank has alienated major segments of Israeli public opinion and generated serious new tensions within his fractious coalition. Many Israelis would prefer to restrict settlements to thinly populated, strategically important areas such as the Jordan Valley. A majority probably would support a moratorium on new settlement activity while autonomy talks are under way.

Moderates in the Cabinet, including Defense Minister Weizman and leaders of the Liberal wing of Begin's dominant Likud bloc and the Democratic Movement, support Jewish settlement in principle but believe Begin has committed gross blunders in his tactical management of settlement policy. These moderates insist that pressing ahead with Jewish resettlement in Hebron, for instance, will only further damage prospects for reaching an autonomy agreement and undermine Israel's relations with the US and leading West European nations.

Begin's popularity with the voters has declined steadily during the past year to under 30 percent, and his parliamentary majority has slipped to a bare five-seat margin in the 120-member Knesset. This has left him more than ever dependent on the support of the hawkish members of his coalition and has added to the determination of the remaining coalition members to hang together to avoid an early national election.

Begin's inability to curb Israel's triple-digit inflation is the prime domestic reason for his government's declining popularity and for the Labor Party's nearly two-to-one lead in the polls over Begin's Likud bloc. Labor, if returned to office, would continue with the Camp David negotiation process while probably looking for an early opportunity to engage Jordan in negotiations for a West Bank - Gaza territorial partition.

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Top Secret

15 April 1980

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Begin in the US

Begin's willingness to precipitate serious Cabinet and public divisions on the eve of his visit reflects the depth of his ideological commitment to permanent retention of the West Bank. In recent interviews he has ruled out legislative authority for a West Bank - Gaza Palestinian self-governing body, and also has taken a hard line against voting rights for East Jerusalem Arabs, coordination of Israeli military deployment in the West Bank and Gaza, and abolition of the Israeli military government in those areas. Begin probably would try to capitalize on any strong US pressure for concessions on these issues or on any hint of US-Egyptian policy coordination to rally Israeli public and coalition support.

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15 April 1980

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To further strengthen his position, Begin also is including in his delegation Foreign Minister Shamir, a like-minded conservative, and Interior Minister Burg, the head of Israel's autonomy negotiating team and a leader of the conservative National Religious Party, Begin's major coalition partner.

At the same time, Begin will make a real effort to obtain a better reading of Egypt's minimum position on the unresolved autonomy issues. He wants to protect the peace treaty, which he regards as a great achievement.

Begin aims to conciliate Sadat on autonomy with tactical concessions that do not jeopardize Israel's claim to ultimate sovereignty over the West Bank. He thus will be highly interested in hearing about Sadat's talks in Washington last week and in learning how Sadat envisions his minimum needs.

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15 April 1980

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